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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a novel fault injection system called CHAOSORCA for system calls in con-
tainerized applications. CHAOSORCA aims at evaluating a given application’s self-protection capa-
bility with respect to system call errors. The unique feature of CHAOSORCA is that it conducts ex-
periments under production-like workload without instrumenting the application. We exhaustively
analyze all kinds of system calls and utilize different levels of monitoring techniques to reason about
the behaviour under perturbation. We evaluate CHAOSORCA on three real-world applications: a file
transfer client, a reverse proxy server and a micro-service oriented web application. Our results show
that it is promising to detect weaknesses of resilience mechanisms related to system calls issues.
1. Introduction
Docker containers are increasingly getting adopted as an
efficient mean to package and deploy applications [23]: over
two million container images are available on DockerHub
and popular images are downloaded millions of times. A
typical system is composed of a number of Docker contain-
ers interacting with each others. Each container is an in-
stance of an image, which describes the software stack that
is needed by the application, starting from the OS, for ex-
ample debian or alpine, all the required dependencies, and
so on. The compiled application and configuration files are
copied in the image. The images used in production are typi-
cally optimized for performances and security, meaning that
anything that is not specifically required by the application
is stripped-down: in the Docker image there is no ssh access
to log into the container, no remote debugger, and so on.
Docker is a key-enabling technology for microservices,
an architectural style promoting simple, loosely-coupled, in-
dividually updateable services organized around business prod-
ucts [7]. Rather than imposing a generic framework that
all microservices need to implement, a key principle of mi-
croservices is that differentmicroservices share no code: each
microservice is implemented using the technological stack
that is best suited. This stack is then specified as a portable
Docker image. As a result, different microservices signif-
icantly differ one from another: they can be implemented
in different programming languages, use different libraries,
and so on. As Docker containers rely on the kernel of the
host OS, the only thing they all have in common is the ker-
nel. Thus, they all rely on system calls to delegate certain
actions to the guest operating system (OS) kernel, such as
networking or writing to a file.
Docker andmicroservices bringmany benefits, in partic-
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ular increasing the rate at which changes can be brought to
production: for example, Netflix releases hundreds of changes
to production every day. However, while the state of a mono-
lithic system is rather binary, it either works according to
the SLA or not, the state of a complex system built around
microservices emerges from their interactions. In a mono-
lithic system, a common framework or middleware would
typically take care of providing reliable communications be-
tween components. This is no more the case with microser-
vices, where each microservice needs to cope with the fail-
ures of other microservices and with the failures of the un-
derlying stack. In this context, how to observe, analyze and
improve the resilience of systems built over Docker and mi-
croservices?
This paper presents CHAOSORCA, a tool to conduct chaos
engineering [27] experiments to assess the resilience of any
Docker-based microservices. Following the principles of
chaos engineering [14], CHAOSORCA supports the follow-
ing.
First, CHAOSORCA supports formalizing the steady state
of the container, by automatically recording system metrics
such as CPU and RAM consumption, network I/O and the
system calls invoked by the container. In addition, CHAOS-
ORCA supports additional metrics provided by developers.
Second, CHAOSORCA supports triggering events than can
impact the steady state of the container, by injecting pertur-
bations into the system calls invoked by the containers. For
a given system call invoked by the container, a perturbation
can delay the actual execution of the system call or can force
returning an error code. Third, CHAOSORCA enables devel-
opers to specify experiments on the production system. By
default, CHAOSORCA perturbs the 푁 most invoked system
calls for a given container, and monitors it before, during
and after the experiment. It then provides a report to the de-
velopers summarizing the experiment, for them to verify of
falsify the resilience hypothesis for that container. Finally,
CHAOSORCA is built on isolation, it allows experiments to
target specific containers, while the other containers running
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aside are not be impacted by the injected perturbations.
A key feature of CHAOSORCA is that it is oblivious from
the internals of the Docker containers involved in chaos ex-
periment. In other words, nomatter what software stack runs
inside the container, CHAOSORCA will always be able to in-
volve that container in a chaos experiment. Our empirical
evaluation on TTorent (written in Java), Nginx (written in C)
and Bookinfo (written in Java, JavaScript, Python and Ruby)
shows that CHAOSORCA 1) can observe Docker-based mi-
croservices of very different nature, 2) can identify issues
related to the resilience of those microservices against per-
turbation in system calls, 3) can improve the observability of
microservices and the relevance of chaos experiments and
4) it can be applied in production with low overhead, though
not all kinds of overhead are equal.
To sum up our contributions are:
• A novel architecture for achieving observability and
system call perturbation for containerized applications
in Docker, able to analyze the resilience of Docker ap-
plications in a black-box manner.
• A prototype implementation based on the state-of-art
libraries used in industry, applicable to off-the-shelf
Docker microservices. The prototype is called CHA-
OSORCA and is made publicly available at https://
github.com/KTH/royal-chaos/tree/master/chaosorca.
• An evaluation of the approach on three case studies,
representing typical polyglot microservices in Docker,
namely TTorent (written in Java), Nginx (written in C)
and Bookinfo (written in Java, JavaScript, Python and
Ruby)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives a brief introduction about relevant concepts. Sec-
tion 3 discusses about the design of CHAOSORCA like the re-
quirements, components and implementation. Section 4 an-
swers the 4 research questions by discussing about the eval-
uation experiments. Section 6 compares the related work
in fault injection and observability. Section 7 concludes the
whole paper.
2. Background
2.1. System Call
A system call is the fundamental interface between an
application and the kernel [44]. In the Linux operating sys-
tem, there are more than 300 unique system calls and more
than 100 different error codes that can be returned from sys-
tem calls [11]. System calls are primitives exposed by the
OS kernel to deal with crucial resources like hardware de-
vices, network or files in a systematic and secure manner.
When an application requests the use of such a resource, it
has to interact with the OS kernel through a system call.
It is very common for applications to invoke system calls,
even if developers are not aware of such invocations. Fig-
ure 1 is a flame graph [30] that illustrates user events and
kernel events when downloading a file with TTorrent. In the
Figure 1: Flamegraph from TTorrent Execution. The green
part shows application code, the red part shows OS code. The
width of the bars shows the frequency at which that function
is present in the stack traces.
figure, the green (light) blocks stand for user events, caused
by Java code. The red (dark) ones are events related to sys-
tem calls inside the kernel. The width of the bars stand for
the frequency at which that function is present in the stack
traces, or part of a stack trace ancestry.[30] For TTorrent,
those system calls mostly happen when it opens a file, uses
network resources or writes downloaded blocks into a file.
2.2. Containerization
Containerization is a lightweight virtualization mecha-
nism to support rapid shipment and deployment of applica-
tions. A containerized application relies on the kernel of
the host OS. Sharing the kernel and avoiding the need for a
guest OS typically yields better performance and a reduced
footprint. One of the most popular implementations of con-
tainerization is Docker [7]. Docker supports process-level
isolation, with two concepts from the kernel that are used:
namespaces and cgroups. Namespaces are used to isolate
certain resources: a network stack, its own processes tree
and other resources. For example, a container cannot see or
interact with the processes running in another container. The
cgroups are used for specifying what computer resources a
container should be able to access, such as certain amount
of RAM, CPU cores, file system access and similar [26].
Docker containers can share namespaces. For example,
sharing process ID (PID) namespace allows one container to
access other containers’ processes. Sharing an inter-process
communication (IPC) namespace means that containers use
the same network stacks and memory region. The feature of
shareable namespaces in Docker is key for CHAOSORCA: it
enables it to conduct experiments without modifying exist-
ing containers.
2.3. Observability
Observability [40] is the ability to collect values about
some parts of the internal state of a system, based on its
external behaviour. Increasing a system’s observability is
extremely valuable for debugging and reasoning about fail-
ures. Observability leverages three types of strategies: well
designed event logs, sufficient monitoring metrics and trac-
ing. An event log can be in different forms, plain text, struc-
tured or binary. Monitoring metrics usually combine infor-
mation are different levels. For example, CPU and mem-
ory usage are useful for finding out problems like infinite
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loops or memory leaks. Also, the ratio of successful HTTP
requests is helpful to describe whether the system is run-
ning under acceptable status. Tracing is a technique that
combines distributed but related events together, such as a
user request which spans multiple micro-services. Tracing
is hard as it requires each application in the request path to
propagate tracing information [43].
2.4. Chaos Engineering
Chaos engineering is a technique that evaluates resilience
in production environment. When an application is deployed
into production, it faces uncertainties like unstable network,
unavailable third-party services and unbalanced traffic. A
well designed application should be able to bear these unan-
ticipated scenarios without any serious impact for the users.
Tools for chaos engineering actively inject different kinds of
failures into a production system and try to learn how the
system behaves under perturbation. If the system behaves as
expected, such experiments improve the confidence the de-
velopers have about the resilience of the system. Otherwise
the experiment points out weaknesses in the ability of the
system to handle failures [27].
There are five principles in chaos engineering that de-
scribe how developers should apply such a technique into
their production system: 1) The very first one is to build a
series of hypotheses about the system’s steady state. The
steady state is defined based on monitorable metrics. An hy-
pothesis describes how the steady state is expected to change
under a certain event which is triggered during chaos engi-
neering experiments. 2) The second principle is that a fail-
ure injected by a chaos engineering experiment simulates a
real-world event. For example, a simulated failure may be
that the space of a disk is full, or a function returns with
an exception. 3) As the goal of chaos engineering is to build
confidence in a production system, chaos engineering exper-
iments should be done after deployment, instead of in a test-
ing environment. 4) Since it is impossible to predict every
failure in a software system, chaos engineering experiments
should be conducted continuously: automation is the fourth
principle in chaos engineering. 5) The last but same impor-
tant principle is “blast radius control”. The term “blast ra-
dius” describes the seriousness of impacts caused by chaos
engineering experiments. Running chaos engineering exper-
iments are done so as to minimize negative influences on
end-user experience.
3. Design of CHAOSORCA
Following the principles of chaos engineering, CHAOS-
ORCA aims at improving the observability and automatically
conducting chaos experiments in containerized applications.
CHAOSORCA supports monitoring, system call perturbation
and chaos experiment orchestration. The core design prin-
ciple is to gather sufficient insights about resilience, while
causing minimal influence on the system under study. The
requirements for designing CHAOSORCA are described as
follows:
Requirement 1. Black-box containers: CHAOSORCA should
consider containers as black-boxes. In a production system,
the images specifying the containers are often optimized for
performance and security, meaning that it is impractical, if
even possible, to weave-in extra instrumentation in the im-
age directly. All action by CHAOSORCA should thus be im-
plemented in a way that does not require instrumenting the
containers. In other terms, CHAOSORCA should consider
containers as pure, untouchable black-box entities. A posi-
tive implication of this requirement is that it reduces the ef-
fort of developers to the minimum for using CHAOSORCA:
an application container is deployed normally and CHAOS-
ORCA is attached to it when developers need to run chaos
experiments.
Requirement 2. Monitoring: As mentioned in Section 2,
observability is a foundation to analyze how the system be-
haviour differs during a chaos experiment. Given Require-
ment 1, the internals of a container cannot be directly ob-
served. CHAOSORCA must monitor the surroundings of the
containers and gather information to assess resilience weak-
nesses. This includes monitoring the impact that the con-
tainers have on the physical resources (RAM, CPU), on the
I/O (network activity), and how they use system calls on the
host kernel.
Requirement 3. System call perturbation: CHAOSORCA is
designed for analyzing resiliencewith respect to system calls.
Thus, CHAOSORCA should be able to perturb a specific type
of system call. The form of perturbations also include 1)
force a system call to directly return with an error code, 2)
add a delay before a system call is actually completed, and
3) a combination of delay and error injection.
Requirement 4. Minimizing blast radius: In a production
system, a server may host hundreds of containers, it is thus
critical for CHAOSORCA to be able to target specific con-
tainers without influencing the others, so as to limit the blast
radius of chaos experiments. Within this specific container,
CHAOSORCA should be able to only perturb one single pro-
cess as well.
3.1. Overview of CHAOSORCA
To fulfill the requirements listed above, CHAOSORCA is
divided into three components: 1) monitor, 2) perturbator
and 3) orchestrator. The interactions among them are de-
scribed in Figure 2. The monitor component is responsible
for capturing the system behaviour at runtime. The perturba-
tor injects different kinds of failures with respect to system
calls. The orchestrator controls the monitor and perturba-
tor components to conduct chaos experiments and generates
reports.
3.2. The CHAOSORCA Monitor Component
Observability is essential to control and analyze chaos
experiments. The monitor component implements require-
ment 2. In order to connect low-level system call perturba-
tions with application-level behaviour, the monitor compo-
nent provides different levels of observability, respectively
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Figure 2: The Architecture of CHAOSORCA and The Interactions between Each Component: Solid Lines Stand for Control Flows.
Dashed Lines Stand for Data Flows.
1) container level, 2) system call level and 3) application
level.
At the container level, the monitor records CPU time,
memory usage, network traffic as follows. The monitoring
component relies on shareable namespaces offered byDocker,
it runs as a process which shares a specific namespace with
the target container under study. This type of design ful-
fills requirement 1: the monitor provides strong observabil-
ity with no modification or intrusion into the target container
image.
For the system call level, the monitor component records
the invoked system calls information including type, argu-
ments and result. Regarding application level monitoring,
themonitor cares about whether the application fulfills a user
request, where the definition of fulfillment varies from one
application to another. For example, for a web server, the
monitor observes the HTTP response codes and the latency
in handling HTTP requests.
3.3. The CHAOSORCA Perturbator Component
The perturbator component is designed to inject system
call failures at runtime. It addresses both requirement 3 and
1. A system call perturbation is defined as a tuple (푠, 푒, 푑)
where 푠 represents the type of a system call, 푒 means the er-
ror code of this system call to be injected, and 푑 denotes the
delay before this system call is actually invoked. In CHAOS-
ORCA, the perturbator works as follows, it intercepts an ex-
isting system call that is invoked by the application, then ask
for commands from the orchestrator (cf. Section 3.4) about
whether injecting a specific failure in this system call. Per
requirement 3, the perturbator supports failures that could be
either an error code, or a certain delay, or a combination of
the both.
Let us consider the example of the TTorrent file down-
load procedure shown in Figure 1. When TTorrent needs to
save a piece of downloaded file on disk, the logic in method
PieceStorageImpl/savePiece is executed. This leads the JVM
(i) to invoke a pwrite system call, and (ii) to write bytes of
data into a file through this system call. Our perturbator can
target such types of system calls, it can intercept this pwrite
system call and injects a failure in TTorrent.
For the perturbator component, it is also important to
minimize the blast radius, according to requirement 4. Thanks
to the shareable namespaces feature of Docker introduced
in Section 2.2, CHAOSORCA is able to accurately inject sys-
tem call invocation failures into a specific container only to
minimize the blast radius. Regarding over-consumption is-
sues an injected failure may cause, the blast radius can be
still controlled by limiting the resources (CPU, RAM, etc.)
a container is allowed to use. [1]
3.4. The CHAOSORCA Orchestrator Component
The orchestrator component acts as an interface between
CHAOSORCA and the fault injection strategies defined by the
developers. It provides a command line interface for devel-
opers who want to apply CHAOSORCA. Based on the con-
figuration, the orchestrator controls the monitor and pertur-
bator components to explore a set of system call perturba-
tions in the target application. Such a procedure is described
in Algorithm 1. Line 1 and 2 are executed to gather the ap-
plication’s normal behaviour. The triple for-loops construct
all possible system call failures and gather the perturbed be-
haviour for a comparison.
There are three phases for a fault injection experiment:
1) before perturbation, 2) during perturbation and 3) after
perturbation as follows. First of all, before perturbation, the
orchestrator attaches the monitor, the perturbator and itself
to the target application. It feeds the application with a piece
of workload in order to gather information about the normal
behaviour of this application. After that, the orchestrator ac-
tivates the perturbator to inject a specific system call failure
defined in Section 3.3, this is the perturbation phase. Fi-
nally, the perturbator is turned off and the after-perturbation
phase starts, the orchestrator keeps pulling monitoring in-
formation and computes the metric differences. With those
three phases, CHAOSORCA enables itself to detect whether a
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Algorithm 1 Fault Injection Experiments for Containers
Input:
An application Docker container 퐴;
A repeatable workload for this application푊 ;
A set of system call types 푇 ;
A set of system call error codes 퐸;
A set of delay values 퐷;
Output:
푅 a map of behaviour difference per perturbation;
1: Attach monitor, feed 퐴 with푊
2: normal_behaviour← monitored metrics;
3: for each syscall type 푡 ∈ 푇 do
4: for each error code 푒 ∈ 퐸 ∪ {0} do
5: for each delay 푑 ∈ 퐷 ∪ {0} do
6: if 푒 == 0 and 푑 == 0 then
7: Continue; // same to normal execution
8: end if
9: perturbation 푝←< 푡, 푒, 푑 >;
10: Feed 퐴 with푊 under 푝
11: perturbed_behaviour← monitored metrics;
12: 푑푖푓푓 ← Diff(normal_behaviour, perturbed_be-
haviour)
13: 푅 ← 푅 ∪ {< 푡, 푒, 푑 >∶ 푑푖푓푓}
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
17: return 푅;
system call failure has an instantaneous influence (in phase
during-perturbation) or it has a long lasting influence even
after the perturbation (in phase during-after).
Regarding the behaviour analysis in the during- and after-
phases in our experiments, CHAOSORCA considers a mix of
generic and domain specific dimensions. The generic di-
mension is 1) whether the application continues to run with-
out a crash and 2) how the metrics under monitoring vary
compared to nominal behaviour. CHAOSORCA also consid-
ers domain specific dimensions. For example, for web appli-
cations, CHAOSORCA compares whether the HTTP response
code is 200. A procedure of comparing an application’s per-
turbed behaviour with normal behaviour is called “Diff” in
Algorithm 1.
3.5. The CHAOSORCA Visualization Component
By default all metrics monitored by CHAOSORCA are
saved into a time-series database. The developers can query
this data as a table and investigate them after fault injection
experiments. CHAOSORCA also has a separate component
that visualizes all the monitored metrics as line charts.
For the convenience of resilience analysis, the following
features are supported by the visualization component: 1)
auto-refresh the charts in a configurable time rate, 2) high-
light the perturbations, 3) aggregate the metrics with a de-
veloper defined configuration. For example, one chart can
display the rate of all different system calls with a legend. In
this way it helps developers to intuitively compare the rate
Figure 3: CHAOSORCA Visualization Component, with one
monitored metric (green line), and one perturbation campaign
(blue overlay)
among different system calls at a certain time point.
Figure 3 shows an example of the visualization compo-
nent. The line chart describes how the CPU usage changes
during fault injection experiments. A blue overlay indicates
a period of system call perturbations, which also divides the
figure into three phases: before, during, and after the pertur-
bations. The green line explains that the CPU usage drops
during the perturbations and catches up afterward. TheCHA-
OSORCA visualization component draws one line chart for
each of the monitored metrics similarly.
3.6. Implementation
The monitor component uses cAdvisor1 to gather con-
tainer-specific metrics like CPU usage, memory usage and
network traffic metrics. For monitoring HTTP requests, the
monitor combines PyShark2, a python library for TShark to
get HTTP response code and latency. For collecting the sys-
tem calls the monitor uses the open-source tool Bpftrace3 to
observe the number and type of system calls. All the above
monitoring information is pushed to a Prometheus time-series
database4.
Then CHAOSORCA uses Grafana5 to visualize the data
for developers. The perturbator component is mainly imple-
mented with Strace 6, which is a diagnostic, debugging and
instructional userspace utility for Linux. The orchestrator
component itself is written in Python. It provides a com-
mand line interface to developers to define system call per-
turbation arguments like type, error code and delay. CHAOS-
ORCA is publicly-available at https://github.com/KTH/royal-
chaos/tree/master/chaosorca.
4. Evaluation
This section discusses the evaluation of CHAOSORCA,
which focuses on the following 4 research questions:
1https://github.com/google/cadvisor
2https://kiminewt.github.io/pyshark/
3https://github.com/iovisor/bpftrace
4https://prometheus.io/
5https://grafana.com/
6https://strace.io/
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of The Subject Programs
Application Desc. Lang. LoC #Containers
TTorrent File downloading
tool
Java 14.3K 1
Nginx Reverse proxy C 141.1K 1
Bookinfo Micro-service
based web appli-
cation
Java,
Python,
Ruby
10.0K 6
RQ1. What system call perturbations are of interest for con-
tainerized applications?
RQ 2. What kind of resilience problems are identified with
fault injection in containerized applications?
RQ 3. How is multi-layer observability helpful to analyze
the results of chaos experiments?
RQ 4. What is the overhead of conducting chaos experi-
ments using CHAOSORCA?
4.1. Subject Programs
We experiment CHAOSORCA on three different applica-
tions, in order to evaluate its ability at perturbing system
calls and at detecting resilience weaknesses in containerized
applications. We selected the applications according to the
following criteria: 1) medium-sized, well implemented ap-
plications with source code available, 2) contain both client
side and server side code 3) can be deployed as Docker con-
tainers and 4) it is possible to simulate production-like work-
loads in the laboratory.
The first application is TTorrent7, a file downloading client
that uses the BitTorrent protocol. The second application is
Nginx8, a popular and mature reverse proxy. The last one
is Bookinfo9, a micro-service based reference application
which runs several containers written in different languages.
The key descriptive metrics of those subjects are shown in
Table 1 (e.g the number of containers, programming lan-
guages, lines of code). Note that CHAOSORCA focuses on a
subset of containers in a larger software system and leave the
other containers running normally. To that extent, it would
likely work on perturbing one single isolated container in a
very large system.
4.2. Experimental Protocol
Protocol for RQ1: In order to select the most interesting
system calls for chaos experiments, we consider two dimen-
sions: 1) the prevalence of a system call during execution
2) the functionality of the system call under study. The first
dimension is investigated by monitoring applications. The
second one needs more domain knowledge. For example,
an application which frequently writes files invokes 푤푟푖푡푒 a
lot. So푤푟푖푡푒 takes a large ratio in all happened system calls.
Before invoking 푤푟푖푡푒, another system call open needs to be
7https://github.com/mpetazzoni/ttorrent
8http://hg.nginx.org/nginx/file/tip
9https://github.com/istio/istio/tree/master/samples/bookinfo
invoked. It opens the target file and returns the file descrip-
tor. open system call may not be invoked lots of times, but it
is still interesting since 푤푟푖푡푒, 푟푒푎푑 system calls rely on it.
Every application runs for 1 minute under a simulated
workload, and we perform 3 rounds of executions in total
for a statistical reason. In this experiment, CHAOSORCA
only monitors the applications and does not inject any fail-
ure. The workloads are as follows: TTorrent is executed to
download an Ubuntu installation file from the internet, the
file is 1.86GB in size. For Nginx, three types of valid GET
requests including /, /abc and /abc?cache=bust are sent to
the container. For Bookinfo, a collection of valid GET and
POST requests are used to trigger the following features: the
login logic; accessing the main page; accessing a product
page and logging out. For all three applications, CHAOS-
ORCA calculates the rate of different types of system calls.
Protocol for RQ2: For each system call identified as rel-
evant in RQ1, three different perturbation strategies are eval-
uated according to Algorithm 1: 1) injecting a system call er-
ror code without any delay 2) injecting a certain delay after
which the system call succeeds and 3) injecting both an error
code and a delay. Considering there are more than 100 dif-
ferent error codes that can be returned by system calls [11],
we carefully select 6 error codes such that they are all re-
lated to resource and permission issues [8], namely EACCES,
EPERM, ENOENT, EIO, EINTR and ENOSYS. We do so because these
system call errors are representative of real-life failures. For
example, error code EACCES means “permission denied”, in-
dicating that the file permissions do not allow the attempted
operation. Then we run chaos experiments with these 6 error
codes and 2 different delay values (1s and 5s). The workload
for these applications are the same with RQ1. Both generic
and domain specific dimensions described in Section 3.4 are
used for behaviour comparison.
Protocol for RQ3: The experiment protocol is the same
as for RQ2. However, for this research question, we focus
on monitoring and data visualization. Consequently, RQ3
is discussed qualitatively. For example, by removing part
of observability provided by CHAOSORCA, such as closing
HTTP response code monitoring, we analyze whether it is
still possible to correctly detect resilience problems.
Protocol for RQ4: A study of the overhead of CHA-
OSORCA is important to assess its applicability. To answer
RQ4, we respectively evaluate the overhead caused by the
monitor component and the perturbator component. For the
network overhead, Nginx is used as a target application. Then,
the tool Siege 10 is used to simulate a number of concurrent
users sending requests for 3 minutes. The number of users
is respectively 5, 10, 25, 200, 1000, 2000 during the experi-
ment.
For system call monitoring and perturbation overhead,
in order to stimulate a high amount of system calls, dd com-
mand is used as a target application. dd is a Linux command
which mainly coverts and copies files. It invokes a huge
amount of 푟푒푎푑 and 푤푟푖푡푒 system calls. The command to
10Siege (https://github.com/JoeDog/siege) is an http load tester which
generates requests at a fast rate
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Table 2
The Statistics of System Calls per Second for Each Application
under The Given Workload without Any Perturbations
System Call TTorrent Nginx Bookinfo
accept 1780 (9.92%) 293.45 (3.90%)
accept4 21.21 (1.17%)
bind 173.57 (2.31%)
clone 166.57 (9.17%) 232.77 (3.09%)
close 92 (0.51%) 280.37 (3.73%)
connect 163.03 (2.17%)
ctl 19.24 (1.06%)
dup 175.95 (2.34%)
dup2 64.31 (0.36%)
exit 62.4 (0.35%) 174.36 (2.32%)
fcntl 161.89 (2.15%)
futex 3240 (18.06%) 854.96 (11.36%)
getpid 160.52 (8.84%) 159.6 (2.12%)
getsockname 48.77 (2.69%) 174.84 (2.32%)
getsockopt 167.27 (2.22%)
ioctl 189.22 (2.51%)
list 247.43 (3.29%)
lseek < 0.01 < 0.01
madvise 79.28 (0.44%) 176.86 (2.35%)
mmap 191.09 (1.07%) < 0.01
mprotect 677 (3.77%) 15.74 (0.21%)
munmap 0.03 (< 0.01%) < 0.01
newfstat < 0.01 140.56 (7.74%) 206.17 (2.74%)
newlstat
newstat 89.96 (4.95%) 1300 (17.27%)
newuname
open < 0.01 166.15 (9.15%) 222.19 (2.95%)
poll 181.12 (2.41%)
pread64 1410 (7.86%) 99.37 (5.47%)
pwrite64 1520 (8.47%) 147.4 (8.12%)
read 3570 (19.90%) 158.48 (2.11%)
recvfrom 90.37 (4.98%) 130.69 (1.74%)
recvmsg 174.7 (2.32%)
select 388.57 (5.16%)
sendfile64 264.61 (14.57%)
sendto 161.78 (2.15%)
setsockopt 29.41 (1.62%) 287.41 (3.82%)
shutdown 170.71 (2.27%)
sigprocmask 46.78 (0.26%)
socket 263.94 (3.51%)
wait 3040 (16.95%)
write 2110 (11.76%) 87.04 (4.79%) 238.31 (3.17%)
writev 284.63 (15.68%)
yield 55.18 (0.31%)
test dd is dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null bs=1 count=500000k,
which copies zero to the void for 500 million times.
4.3. RQ1: What system call perturbations are of
interest for containerized applications?
The statistics of the invoked system calls are listed in Ta-
ble 2. Each line describes one of the system call invoked
during the execution. Each column shows the number and
percentage of system call invocations in one containerized
application. A blank cell means that a system call is never
invoked by the corresponding application under the given
workload. Some system calls are rarely used by the applica-
tion, which are noted as < 0.01. For example, the first row
of the table tells that TTorrent invokes the accept system call
1780 times every second, which takes about 9.92% of the
total. While Nginx never invokes the 푎푐푐푒푝푡 system call,
Bookinfo invokes it 293.45 times per second which takes
3.90% of the total.
From Table 2 we could see that the types of most used
system calls differ in applications. For example, TTorrent
invokes read and futexmost frequently. This actually makes
sense because TTorrent takes advantages of multi-threading
to download files. System calls like read, futex are keys
to support TTorrent’s functionality. Thus these most used
system calls are of interest for evaluating TTorrent. Book-
info invokes the most types of system calls during an experi-
ment, because it is micro-service based and has a more com-
plex business logic. For HTTP based applications including
Nginx and Bookinfo, the system calls used in common are
clone, getpid, getsockname, newfstat, newstat, open, recvfrom,
setsockopt and write.
With the help of CHAOSORCA, developers are able to
focus more on the most critical system calls per application.
This makes the following resilience evaluationmore targeted
and effective.
Answer to RQ1
Over our three case studies, we observe a total of 44 dif-
ferent types of system calls exercised by the containerized
applications under study. By analyzing the prevalence and
the functionality of each of them, 9 types of system calls
are identified as relevant for fault injection experiments
in containerized applications, namely open, write, writev,
read, readv, sendfile, sendfile64, poll and select.
4.4. RQ2: What kind of resilience problems are
identified with fault injection in containerized
applications?
According to the experiment protocol, we have conducted
9푥(6+2+6푥2) = 180 rounds of experiments. After finishing
all the experiments, we qualitatively analyzed the influence
caused by each perturbation. In the following, we discuss the
most used system calls. The interested reader can access to
the comprehensive experimental data at https://github.com/K
TH/royal-chaos/tree/master/chaosorca.
4.4.1. Evaluations on TTorrent
Table 3 shows a sample of experiment results in TTor-
rent. As it is a file downloading client, system calls like open,
write, read are the most used ones. In this table, each row
describes one perturbation and TTorrent’s corresponding be-
haviour. Each cell is the result of the comparison of the ap-
plication’s behaviour under and after perturbation.
From Table 3 it can be seen that only adding a delay to
open, write, read system calls have a critical influence on net-
work usage. Especially row 21 and 22 show that the 푟푒푎푑
system call perturbation causes the biggest dip in network
IO. Recalling Table 2, this is consistent because the read sys-
tem call is the most common one, it occurs almost 20 percent
of the total number of calls.
Another insight from the table is that for the open system
call perturbations, network IO dips initially during the per-
turbation and then catches up after. For write and read sys-
tem call perturbations, the network traffic stops completely
and the number of system calls drops to nearly zero. This
indicates that TTorrent is able to bear system call delays but
is more sensitive to system call errors.
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Table 3
Representative Sample of Chaos Experiments on TTorrent
0 System Call Error Code Delay Trend of Syscalls Network IO Cpu Usage Memory Usage
1 open - 1s fewer, spike small dip increase normal
2 open - 5s increase dip dip, increase normal
3 open EACESS - increase normal increase normal
4 open EACESS 1s increase small dip increase normal
5 open EACESS 5s increase dip dip, increase normal
6 write - 1s tiny tiny dip normal
7 write - 5s small tiny dip normal
8 write EACESS - tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
9 write EACESS 1s tiny, tiny spike stops tiny, tiny normal
10 write EACESS 5s tiny, small spike stops tiny, tiny normal
11 write EPERM - tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
12 write EPERM 1s tiny, small spike stops tiny, tiny normal
13 write EPERM 5s small, increase tiny, small tiny, small normal
14 write ENOENT - small, spike stops tiny, tiny normal
15 write ENOENT 1s spike, tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
16 write ENOENT 5s tiny, small spike stops tiny, tiny normal
17 write EIO - small, small spike stops tiny, tiny normal
18 write EIO 1s small, small spike stops tiny, tiny normal
19 write EIO 5s small, small spike stops tiny, tiny normal
20 read - 1s big dip big dip big dip normal
21 read - 5s big dip big dip big dip normal
22 read EACESS - tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
23 read EACESS 1s tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
24 read EACESS 5s small, small stops tiny, tiny normal
25 read EPERM - tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
26 read EPERM 1s tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
27 read EPERM 5s tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
28 read ENOENT - tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
29 read ENOENT 1s tiny stops tiny, tiny normal
30 read ENOENT 5s small stops tiny, tiny normal
4.4.2. Evaluations on Nginx
Table 4 describes the most interesting findings from our
experiments on Nginx. For Nginx, the perturbations that
have an obvious effect are those on open, write, writev and
sendfile. As an example, the first row records the Nginx be-
haviour under an open system call perturbation: adding a 1
second delay with no system call error code. However, the
HTTP response code becomes 0 and the latency increases to
more than 50ms. The number of total system calls decreases
during the perturbation compared to the normal execution.
The network and CPU usage stay low while some spikes oc-
cur. The usage of memory increases during the experiment.
This proves that Nginx is able to handle open system call de-
lays and the usage of calculation resources stays acceptable.
Row 1 to row 20 shows that an open system call pertur-
bation has different effects depending on the injected error
code. An 퐸퐴퐶퐶퐸푆 error results in HTTP 403 Forbidden,
an 퐸푁푂퐸푁푇 error leads to 404 Not Found instead. An
퐸푃퐸푅푀 , 퐸퐼푁푇푅, or 퐸푁푂푆푌 푆 results in HTTP 500
Internal Server Error. This could be considered as a good
practice because developers designed a more detailed reac-
tion strategies with respect to different system call errors.
Another interesting insight to look at is the read system
call perturbations (row 26 to row 30). When such a perturba-
tion is injected, the application still functions normally as the
HTTP response code is still 200. The trend of system calls
and the network IO stay normal as well. According to these
experiments, developers gain more confidence that Nginx is
able to survive from read system call errors.
4.4.3. Evaluations on Bookinfo
Table 5 gives a representative sample of our experimen-
tal results. For the Bookinfo application, the system call per-
turbations that have a significant effect are open, write, read,
poll and select. Compared toNginx, whenCHAOSORCA in-
jects delays into the open system call, the code of responses
are divided into 200 and 302. Code 302 means a redirec-
tion to another url. Considering the Bookinfo containers as
a black box, we assume that this is because the injected de-
lay causes a timeout exception in Bookinfo’s components. In
order to lead users to a retry logic, Bookinfo redirects the re-
quest to an initial page. For the select system call perturba-
tions, Bookinfo directly crashes if an error code is injected.
This indicates that the application is sensitive to select sys-
tem call errors, and its self-protection strategies are not able
to pull Bookinfo back to normal when such a perturbation
happens.
Answer to RQ2
By performing fault injection in three different container-
ized applications, we show that two kinds of resilience
problems are identified by CHAOSORCA: 1) the applica-
tion is not resilient to some system call failures: if certain
system calls fail, the whole application crashes and 2) the
application is sensitive to system call errors: if certain sys-
tem calls fail, the application consumes significantly more
system resources.
4.5. RQ3: How is multi-layer observability helpful
to analyze the results of chaos experiments?
In order to improve the observability of target applica-
tions, the monitoring component in CHAOSORCA records
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Table 4
Representative Sample of Chaos Experiments on Nginx
0 System Call Error Code Delay HTTP Res. Latency Trend of Syscalls Network IO Cpu Usage Memory Usage
1 open - 1s 0 up after 50ms fewer during tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
2 open - 5s 0 up after 96ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
3 open EACCES - 403 0 fewer small small increasing
4 open EACCES 1s 403 (fewer) increasing 102ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
5 open EACCES 5s 403 (FEW) increasing 140ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
6 open EPERM - 500 0 fewer small smaller increasing
7 open EPERM 1s 500 (fewer) increasing 57ms normal, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
8 open EPERM 5s 500 (FEW) increasing 175ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
9 open ENOENT - 404 0 fewer small small increasing
10 open ENOENT 1s 404 (fewer) increasing 150ms normal, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
11 open ENOENT 5s 404 (FEW) increasing 97ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
12 open EIO - 500 0 fewer small smaller increasing
13 open EIO 1s 500 (fewer) increasing 96ms increase, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
14 open EIO 5s 500 (FEW) increasing 172ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
15 open EINTR - 500 0 fewer small smaller increasing
16 open EINTR 1s 500 (fewer) increasing 96ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
17 open EINTR 5s 500 (FEW) increasing 70ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
18 open ENOSYS - 500 0 normal small smaller increasing
19 open ENOSYS 1s 500 (fewer) increasing 149ms normal, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
20 open ENOSYS 5s 500 (FEW) increasing 159ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
21 write - 1s 0 up after 75ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
22 write - 5s 0 up after 51ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
23 write EACCES - 200 0 normal normal increase increasing
24 write EACCES 1s 200 (FEW) up after 56ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
25 write EACCES 5s 0 up after 107ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
26 read - 1s 200 0 normal normal increase increasing
27 read - 5s 200 0 normal normal increase increasing
28 read EACCES - 200 0 normal normal increase increasing
29 read EACCES 1s 200 0 normal normal increase increasing
30 read EACCES 5s 200 0 normal normal increase increasing
31 sendfile - 1s 0 up after 35ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
32 sendfile - 5s 0 up after 172ms FEWER, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
33 sendfile EACCES - 0 0 increase small normal increasing
34 sendfile EACCES 1s 0 up after 59ms normal, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
35 sendfile EPERM - 0 0 normal small normal increasing
36 sendfile EPERM 1s 0 up after 64ms fewer, spike tiny, spike tiny, spike increasing
Table 5
Representative Sample of Chaos Experiments on Bookinfo
System Call Error Code Delay HTTP Res. Latency Trend of Syscalls Network IO Cpu Usage Memory Usage
open - 1s 200 / 302 increase 5ms normal normal increase normal
open - 5s 200(lower) / 302 up after 2ms increase normal increase increase
open EACESS - 200(lower) / 302 0 fewer, up smaller increase normal
read - 1s 200(fewer) / 302 increasing 2ms increase smaller increase increase
read - 5s 200(FEW) / 302 up after 4ms increase, spike small, spike increase, spike increase
read EACESS - 0 0 normal small smaller normal
read EACESS 1s 0 up after 1ms increase, spike small, spike smaller, spike increase
read EACESS 5s 0 up after 1ms normal, spike small, spike smaller, spike increase
select - 1s 200(FEW) / 302 up after 6ms normal, spike tiny, spike smaller, spike increase
select - 5s 0 up after 12ms tiny, spike tiny, spike small, spike increase
select EACESS - crash - - - - -
select EACESS 1s crash - - - - -
select EACESS 5s crash - - - - -
select EPERM - crash - - - - -
select EPERM 1s crash - - - - -
select EPERM 5s crash - - - - -
different levels of metrics: 1) system call level, 2) container
level and 3) application level. In order to easily compare the
changes under perturbation with a normal execution, all of
these metrics are visualized by CHAOSORCA in a Grafana
dashboard.
For example, Figure 4 is a metrics visualization of an
experiment on Nginx. In this series of experiments, CHA-
OSORCA injects an EACCES error every time when the open
system call is invoked. In the figure, a blue line stands for
a specific system call perturbation. From the figure it can
be seen that CHAOSORCA monitors Nginx before any per-
turbations for 5 minutes. Then it keeps intercepting open
system calls and injecting an EACCES error in them. After
the perturbator is turned off, CHAOSORCA monitors Nginx
for another 5 minutes. Thanks to the monitor component,
the 5metrics collected by CHAOSORCA namely network IO,
HTTP latency, CPU and memory usage, the amount of in-
voked system calls are observable by developers. The visu-
alization also makes it easier for developers to analyze the
three experiment phases defined in Section 3.4: the trend of
metric changes before, during and after perturbations.
On the other hand, if the observability of target applica-
tion is not sufficient, it brings more obstacles to distinguish
abnormal behaviour. For example, during an OPEN system
call perturbation in Figure 4, the rate of HTTP requests stays
the same. However, most of requests are responded with a
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(a) Network IO (b) HTTP Latency
(c) Memory Usage (d) CPU Usage
(e) Rate of System Calls (f) Rate of HTTP request and
response code
Figure 4: CHAOSORCA Visualization: Nginx with OPEN sys-
tem call EACCES error perturbation. A blue overlay shows
when an perturbation is happening.
403 “Forbidden” code according to sub-figure (f). If CHA-
OSORCA does not bring observability to web application’s
HTTP response code, developers may think that everything
is fine since Nginx still handles a proper amount of requests.
But actually most of the responses are incorrect. Such a per-
turbation does have critical influence on end-users.
Answer to RQ3
For a containerized applications, there are different loca-
tions in the stack that enable engineers to improve observ-
ability. CHAOSORCA shows the feasibility of multi-layer
monitoring at the system call level, the container level and
the application level.
4.6. RQ4: What is the overhead of conducting
chaos experiments using CHAOSORCA?
4.6.1. The Overhead of the Monitoring Component
Figure 5 shows the overhead ofmonitor component when
Nginx is the target application. The first sub-figure records
the amount of HTTP requests per second during the experi-
(a) HTTP requests (b) System calls
(c) CPU Usage (d) Memory Usage
Figure 5: The Overhead of Monitor Component when Nginx
Is The Target Application
ment. The second sub-figure records the rate of system calls.
The last two sub-figures are about the CPU and memory us-
age of the monitor components. Regarding dd command, the
CPU and memory usage metrics are the same as Nginx’s
ones.
For network monitoring, with the increase of HTTP re-
quest rate, sub-figure (a) in Figure 5 shows that the HTTP
request monitoring even fails to monitor every request when
the workload becomes too high. Sub-figure (c) describes
that the CPU usage of network monitoring increases to al-
most two times of the application’s itself. The memory us-
age cost by network monitor ranges from 50MB to 200MB
which is shown in sub-figure (d).
For system call monitoring, the overhead is quite low and
stable. Even under a system call heavy tool like dd, the CPU
usage of the system call monitor module (chaosorca.sysm)
is almost zero (sub-figure c). The memory usage stays at
125MB and never increases (sub-figure d).
Overall for monitor component, the overhead of network
monitoring becomes significant when the rate of user re-
quests are higher than 50∕푠 in the test environment. The
overhead caused by system call monitoring always stays low.
As the memory usage, it is stable and there is no memory
leak during the experiment. The overhead of CHAOSORCA
can be considered as acceptable for a normal amount of work-
load.
4.6.2. The Overhead of Perturbator Component
When the perturbator injects system call failures, the key
metrics are described in Figure 6 and Figure 7. For Nginx,
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(a) HTTP Requests (b) Rate of System Calls
Figure 6: Monitoring during A Perturbation. Each Blue Line
Is A Perturbation. The First Group Affects Nginx’s Behaviour
And The Second One Does Not.
Figure 7: The Rate of System Calls Invoked By dd during A
Perturbation. Each Blue Line Is When A Perturbation Occurs.
it shows that the number of HTTP requests under a normal
workload remains the same. For the system call heavy ap-
plication dd, the perturbations have an significant impact on
the number of system calls. Overall for the perturbator com-
ponent, the usage of system resources remains small during
experiments.
Answer to RQ4
The overhead caused by CHAOSORCA depends on system
call usage and also on the workload. For the monitor com-
ponent, the network monitor overhead increases with the
workload; and the system call monitor overhead is low. As
for the perturbator component, our experiment shows that
the overhead is acceptable. Overall, our experiments sug-
gest that the runtime overhead of CHAOSORCA is accept-
able for analyzing resilience of containerized applications.
5. Discussion
5.1. Threats to Validity
One threat to the validity of CHAOSORCA is the pertur-
bation search space has not been completely explored. We
manually selected the 6 most general and relevant system
call error codes for our experiments. However, there are
more than 100 error codes that can be returned by differ-
ent system calls. The interactions between a specific system
call and its possible error codes have not been exhaustively
analyzed. Future work will analyze the perturbation space
with respect to all system call error codes.
Another threat is the generalization of the experimen-
tal results. CHAOSORCA has been evaluated on three differ-
ent types of applications, including a file downloading client
written in Java, a reverse proxy server written in C and a
polyglot micro-service based application which contains 6
containerized services. Though these applications are se-
lected according to the criteria mentioned in Section 4.1,
conducting more experiments on other kinds of applications
may change some answers to the research questions. Fu-
ture work is required to explore other application domains
and evaluate the generalization of the experimental results
in Section 4.
Lastly, in order to exclude accidental effects, we make 3
rounds of experiments for each application (see Section 4.2).
This is not enough for statistical analysis. It is an interesting
area of future work to study statistically causal impact anal-
ysis on the fault injection results, which is little researched
area.
5.2. Extensibility of CHAOSORCA
As introduced in Section 3.6, CHAOSORCA is implemented
using specific features like namespace sharing in Docker.
This limits CHAOSORCA to be applied by only Docker appli-
cations. However, the design of CHAOSORCA can be reused
for other container systems like Singularity11. Furthermore,
Singularity allows to interface with all of the resources, de-
vices and network inside the container from the outside of
the container [16]. Theoretically, by tuning the commands
used by CHAOSORCA’s orchestrator component and apply-
ing specific monitoring tools for Singularity, CHAOSORCA
can be used for the Singularity container system. Another
well-designed container system is Shifter12, which is par-
ticularly used for high performance computing. However,
Shifter does not use network or process namespaces, nor
cgroups. The implementation of ChaosOrca can not be eas-
ily adapted for Shifter. Future work is needed to evaluate
the extensibility and overhead of CHAOSORCA in other con-
tainer systems.
5.3. Resilience Observation With or Without an
Application Container
ChaosOrca aims at allowing observability and fault in-
jection in containers, in order to assess resilience. All of the
research questions and the corresponding experiments are
designed based on a the presence of a container environment.
It is assumed that the resilience observed inside and outside
the container is similar. Future work is needed to systemati-
cally research the difference between the resilience observed
inside and outside an application container, i.e. whether con-
tainerization itself is responsible for changing certain aspects
of resilience.
11https://sylabs.io/
12https://github.com/NERSC/shifter
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6. Related Work
6.1. Fault Injection
Fault injection was originally studied at the hardware
level, for example using radiations to force bit flips [32] or
by interacting with pins to generate processor errors [39].
Later on, software-based approach were developed to emu-
late hardware errors [35] e.g. by injecting memory or net-
work errors [33] or by perturbing the OS kernel [36, 37]. A
number of tools now facilitates the injection of such kinds of
errors, such as Gremlin [10], ChaosCat [6] or cpu-troll [20].
The network layer is another fault injection vector, which has
been studied in depth. Quite a few open-source tools [34, 24,
22, 12, 21] and closed-source tools [10, 6] combine Iptables
with the Traffic Control network emulation tool to inject dif-
ferent kinds of network failures, including latency and drop-
ping a percentage of traffic.
More related to our work, a number of approaches pro-
pose to inject faults at the system call level, for example by
introducing bit flip during the execution of system calls [25],
by corrupting those system calls [42], or by overriding parts
of the glibc library [38], which wraps system calls into a C
API. Besides, approaches have been developed to better con-
trol and protect the access to those system calls [45]. Con-
tainerization, cgroups and namespaces, which we presented
in Section 2, provide process-level isolation and allows to
finely control which resources a given container can access.
Chaos Engineering is an emerging discipline, building
on those fault injection tools, but applying them directly on
the production systems. Netflix for example created a tool
called Chaos Monkey [34] to randomly disable production
servers and to observe how their platformwould handle such
failures. Chaos Monkey has inspired a number of similar
approaches for different production environments, such as
Kubernetes [2, 18, 5], Docker [24, 19], AWS [4] or private
clouds [13] or even the JVM [46] by forcing exceptions.
CHAOSORCA is a novel Chaos Engineering approach,
which proposes to perturb systems calls in a controlled man-
ner. The blast radius of experiments conducted with CHA-
OSORCA is controlled by cgroups and namespaces, which
makes it possible to use it in production: only targeted con-
tainers will be affected.
6.2. Observability
Monitoring is a well researched area. For example, Py-
Mon is a lightweight monitoring solution to collect moni-
toring metrics from the open-source tool monit [31]; Dargos
is a decentralized architecture for monitoring cloud environ-
ments with a low overhead [41]
Moving to container-specific approaches, cAdvisor [9]
by Google enables the collection and export of container
metrics. It provides metrics about CPU, memory, disk and
network usage, which can be for example used to decide
when to scale in and out [29, 28]. Node_exporter [15] is
a tool able to export many different metrics about hardware
and operating system, examples include, CPU, disk, network
and memory statistics.
In Chaos Engineering, metrics are necessary to evaluate
the steady state of the system (before pertubation) and the
current state of the system during an experiment. Netflix
and Google have created a tool called Kayenta [17], which
does automated canary analysis by comparing the key met-
rics of the new deployment version to the old one. If the
canary degrades metrics too much it can automatically abort
the canary [3].
CHAOSORCA does not advocate for a specificmonitoring
approach provided that it can push its data into a Prometheus
timeseries database. If not, an adapter needs to be imple-
mented. Out of the box, CHAOSORCA integrates with cAd-
visor to resources (CPU, RAM, etc), Bpftrace to monitor the
invocation of system calls and PyShark to monitor HTTP re-
quests.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented CHAOSORCA, a novel
Chaos Engineering approach to actively inject system call
failures into a containerized application in order to evaluate
its resilience in face of such perturbations. Under the hood,
CHAOSORCA leverages Linux cgroups and namespaces to
precisely control the blast radius of chaos experiments, CHA-
OSORCA also integrates with different and complementary
monitoring solutions to increase the observability of the sys-
tem. CHAOSORCA introduces perturbations by introducing
errors or delays in the execution of the system calls, as spec-
ified in a resilience experiment.
Our evaluation on three different real-world applications
shows that system call level perturbation is promising to de-
tect weaknesses in self-protection and resiliencemechanisms
embedded in those applications. Our evaluation also shows
that CHAOSORCA improves the observability of a container-
ized application without modifying any source code or con-
figuration in the target container. In the future, we plan to
make CHAOSORCA automatic in the context of a container
orchestration framework such as Docker Swarm or Kuber-
netes.
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